Showing posts with label Hatch-Waxman. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hatch-Waxman. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 14, 2009

Congress pushes for biosimilars pathway

March 2009 saw the US Congress turn its attention to the issue of creating a regulatory pathway for biosimilars (see p. 11). However, two competing visions have emerged, both originating in the House of Representatives, and predictably, one is favoured by the generics industry whilst the other is favoured by the biotech industry. First out of the blocks was a bipartisan bill, H.R. 1427, Promoting Innovation and Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, introduced by Henry Waxman, Nathan Deal, Frank Pallone and Jo Ann Emerson. With Mr Waxman‟s name on the bill, it is no surprise that the generic industry favour this bill. However, within days, a second bill, H.R. 1548, the Pathway for Biosimilars Act, was introduced, again by a bipartisan group of representatives, including Anna Eshoo, Jay Inslee and Joe Barton. This bill has won the approval of BIO.

Both bills are broadly similar, basically attempting to set out a regulatory pathway on the same lines as the Hatch-Waxman Act. However, there is one essential difference between the two: H.R. 1427 gives original biologics five years of exclusivity, with certain modifications of existing drugs getting three years. These periods can be extended for up to a year. Meanwhile, H.R. 1548 provides up to 14 ½ years of data exclusivity for new biologics. It is clear why the generics industry would favour one bill whilst the biologic industry would favour the other. This also suggests the two competing bills are the result of lobbying by the various industry interests. This is backed up by the fact that Representative Inslee represents a Seattle-area district with a strong biotech sector. In addition, Mr Inslee also serves on the House Energy and Commerce Committee, as does Ms Eshoo and Mr Barton, who is the ranking member of the committee. However, the committee is chaired by Mr Waxman, who can also call on support from his cosponsors, Mr Pallone and Mr Deal, so clearly the two bills will be the subject of considerable debate. How the two bills fare in the committee stage will be an interesting battle of wills.

Outside of Congress, the various proponents and opponents of the two bills have shown differing approaches in how they are trying to sell their arguments. BIO has said that it has safety concerns over H.R. 1427, whilst applauds the alternative bill, H.R. 1548, for being safer. However, it seems likely that BIO‟s more immediate concern is over the length of data protection, which is a legitimate concern for the industry, but not necessarily one that will fly with the general public. BIO also expresses concern that H.R. 1427 would jeopardise biotech jobs, noting that the industry supports 7.5 million jobs in America, with these jobs generally being highly paid, and therefore good contributors to the economy. Conversely, the GPhA also uses the economy angle in its support of H.R. 1427, arguing that the bill would help the economy by strengthening healthcare whilst reducing costs to the public. The GPhA adds that the bill is supported by consumer, business and labour organisations. Both sides recognise that a regulatory pathway for biosimilars is inevitable. However, what shape that legislation will ultimately take is less clear, and will seemingly depend on political skills and an ability to convince public opinion.

Ian Platts - Editor, World Generic Markets

Wednesday, February 18, 2009

FTC files testosterone gel complaint

On 2nd February 2009, the Federal Trade Commission announced that it had filed a complaint against brand firm Solvay Pharmaceuticals and generic firms Watson Pharmaceuticals, Par Pharmaceutical Companies and Par’s partner, Paddock Laboratories regarding Solvay’s AndroGel testosterone gel product. The FTC has alleged that the companies violated section 5(a) of the FTC Act, arguing that Solvay entered into agreements with the firms which led to Solvay paying them in return for their not launching generic versions of AndroGel. The FTC’s actions see it return to a familiar and frustrating battle in which it argues that such payment arrangements are anti-competitive, whilst the companies involved argue the exact opposite.

The FTC’s position has for a long time been that agreements in which a branded company essentially pays a generic competitor not to launch a competing product hampers competition and is thus illegal. As an example, in 2001, the FTC brought a lawsuit against Schering-Plough, Upsher-Smith Laboratories and American Home Products alleging such payments regarding Schering’s potassium chloride product, K-Dur 20. Despite settling with AHP, the FTC found little success in the case, with an FTC Administrative Law Judge finding the agreement had been lawful. This led to the FTC overturning the decision, despite it having been made by an FTC judge. However, in 2005, a federal appellate court again found in favour of the companies, and the decision has so far stuck. This, along with another similar decision in 2005 has led to a raft of payment agreements in the years since, which the FTC still contends harms competition by prolonging monopolies.

Given its entrenched view on the matter, it is no surprise that the FTC has again made a complaint. However, the current argument concerning AndroGel does not appear to shed any new light on the issue, and as a result, it seems unlikely that the FTC will succeed this time, either. On the face of it, the FTC’s case is quite sound – Watson gained FDA approval for a generic version of AndroGel in 2006 following the end of the Hatch-Waxman 30-month stay of approval, and Par after that, but did not launch, instead coming to an agreement with Solvay to postpone. However, as always, the devil is in the detail. The patent at the heart of the dispute expires in 2020, with paediatric exclusivity until 2021. Yet, the agreements see generic versions being launched from 2015; the FTC rightfully points out that this is nine years after Watson gained approval, but the firms also rightfully point out that it is five years before the patent expires. The key problem is that although ANDAs were filed with Paragraph IV certifications against the patent, the issue was settled out of court and so the validity of the patent was never tested. As a result, the patent remains in force, which backs up the companies’ argument that the settlement has enabled generic competition ahead of schedule and is therefore pro-competitive. It is hard to see how the FTC can manoeuvre around this problem, and whilst it argues, and probably correctly, that the generic firms entered the agreement not out of respect for Solvay’s patent, but because of the payments Solvay offered, with the patent untested in court, the facts as they stand do not back this up. Unless the FTC can produce compelling evidence, its suspicions will remain nothing more than a hunch.

Ian Platts - Editor, World Generic Markets